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therefore unimaginable and mysterious, natural succession"—says the author, "is indeed reached in its fullness when a man does what he ought to do—when he realizes the moral ideal. But this right determination, this harmony of human action with moral reason, presupposes a power in a finite agent also to act immorally or irrationally, and by so acting, power even to destroy his free agency" (p. civ). But the passage which may be taken as Professor Fraser's most important *confessio fidei* is found on pages xci and xcii. I can quote only the first and last sentence. "Are not Locke's three realities [God, Self and External things] tacitly assumed by all men as immanent in experience from the first, in a faith which becomes at last human reason in its highest form? . . . It thus appears that the spirit in man, unconsciously, if not reflectively presupposes the antithesis which distinguishes each person from the external world with which his senses and actions bring him into contact and collision; and also presupposes God in the physical order, and in the ideals of duty which make science and morality possible." It only remains to add that the problem still remains for philosophy and theology to determine the *nature* of these realities which we are obliged to postulate.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

*Aspects of Pessimism.* By R. M. WENLEY, M.A., D.Sc.,  
Lecturer in Philosophy in Queen Margaret College, Glasgow;  
formerly Examiner in Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.  
William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1894.—  
pp. x, 337.

Dr. Wenley's book has, perhaps, even less unity than its modest title would lead one to suppose. It consists of six essays, which, as the author says, "naturally fall into two groups." The first four, "Jewish Pessimism," "Mediaeval Mysticism," "Hamlet," and "The Pessimistic Element in Goethe," are clearly intended for the general reader; and of the last two, "Berkeley, Kant, and Schopenhauer" and "Pessimism as a System," only the latter comes to close quarters with the problem of Pessimism proper. Such a mass of material relating, for the most part, only indirectly to the main subject, consisting of essays that may be described as theological, literary, and metaphysical, as well as ethical, would of itself suggest,—what we are told in the preface,—that the author had originally intended to write a more systematic book on Pessimism, but had found himself unable to carry out the plan. The obvious excuse for a book of this

very fragmentary character on a subject that already has a literature of its own, would be that either the author's point of view or his criticisms of others were clearly original and suggestive. It can hardly be claimed that in the "Aspects" we have a book which answers to this description. That the author is scholarly, one does not doubt, though one is inclined to wish that his scholarship were rather more special; that he intends to be perfectly just, one does not deny, though he sometimes shows unnecessary irritation in criticising those who have fundamentally different views; but, while it would be grossly unjust to describe the book as 'second-hand' in the ordinary sense, one cannot but feel that the author has honestly and earnestly worked out for himself conclusions which are already more or less familiar.

The essay on "Jewish Pessimism," as might be expected, attempts to show that, in spite of all doubts and difficulties, such as those of Job and Koheleth, Judaism was essentially optimistic by virtue of its faithful and strenuous insistence upon a theistic view of the world. In the main part of the essay, Judaism is regarded as an independent religious system, not as a part of a larger scheme of salvation. The question is: What is the relation of Judaism as such to Pessimism? This being the case, one cannot but feel that any religion of a people, as opposed to a world religion, contains elements of Pessimism just by reason of its exclusiveness. However, the point is not specially important, as the author is mainly concerned to show the relation of Judaism, as viewed from the inside, to Pessimism.

In the second essay, Mysticism is found to be implicitly pessimistic, since an ethic founded upon Mysticism would be hopelessly at variance with necessary social conditions. Notwithstanding this, however, the author shows a certain sympathy with the tendency; and, in the case of the *Imitation of Christ*, makes a strong plea for the essential humanity of the book, and attempts to show that it does not come under the already pronounced condemnation of Mysticism in general. When he says of the "Imitation" that the "amazing vitality" of the book depends upon "its insistence upon life, rather than belief" (p. 85) the remark strikes one as being ambiguous, if not positively misleading. What are we to understand by "life" here? In certain other passages the essentially monastic character of the book is practically recognized, as, *e.g.*, on p. 94, where the author says of Thomas à Kempis, "when he turns to man, and takes note of the things that now are, he is as weak and unsatisfactory as he formerly was vivid and enheartening."

The essays on "Hamlet" and "The Pessimistic Element in Goethe" need not detain us long, though together they occupy about seventy-five pages. Both belong to a kind of criticism which is only too familiar, but which hardly commends itself to the serious student of philosophy. To seek the 'inner meaning,' the 'underlying philosophy,' of the works of a notable literary man, means, in the great majority of cases, to commit the 'psychologist's fallacy.' Particularly is this true in the case of a poet like Shakespeare, whose genius is essentially dramatic. One objects, when Hamlet is regarded as the "type" of humanity "eternally striving to fathom the infinite" (p. 111); and not less, when the author says of *Faust* and *Hamlet* in a breath that they "imply a whole philosophy" (p. 171). One might almost dogmatically say of Shakespeare's works, at least, individually and collectively, that they do nothing of the kind. But one may, of course, read into them more than one philosophy,—as has frequently been done. With Goethe, to be sure, the case is somewhat different; but even he, though deeply interested in philosophy, was too true a literary artist to submit to the fetters of any particular metaphysical system. The 'law of compensation' holds, and Goethe chose what was for him the better part. It may be noticed in passing that, while in other parts of the book insisting upon a morality so stern that any trace of utilitarianism gives offense, the author takes the traditional indulgent view of Goethe's 'development' (*e.g.*, p. 156).

The chapter on "Berkeley, Kant, and Schopenhauer" has only very indirectly to do with the problem of Pessimism proper. The key-note of this long and somewhat tedious chapter is perhaps sounded, when the author says, "Nevertheless, taken broadly, Realism and Nominalism have been fighting out the ancient battle over nearly the whole field of modern speculation" (p. 173). The later development of Berkeley's thought, with its "realistic" tendencies, is much insisted upon. Hume is regarded as a neo-Berkeleyan, in the same sense in which we call F. A. Lange and his followers neo-Kantians. The presentation of the different interpretations of Kant contains little, if anything, that is not familiar; and the same may be said of the criticisms of Schopenhauer. It is to be doubted if the author does justice to Schopenhauer's metaphysical acuteness, though he concedes that the great pessimist's criticism of Kant in his principal work is "much the most subtle, and in many ways conclusive, criticism to which the transcendental method has been subjected" (p. 224). It is to be wished that those who attack

Schopenhauer's great constructive work with so much vigor, would remember to acknowledge the debt they owe to him for his substantial contribution to clear thinking in *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*.

In his preface, the author says he hopes "that the two more technical essays [*i.e.*, the last two] will be regarded as suggestive rather than as final"; and it would be mistaking the intent of the book, in its present form, to insist too much upon the importance of the final chapter, "Pessimism as a System." At the same time it must be said that the chapter is somewhat disappointing. After a brief introduction, in which he refers to the "unreasoned pessimism" of poets like Byron, Leopardi, and DeMusset, about fifteen pages are devoted to a very inadequate summary and criticism of Schopenhauer's system. The rest of the chapter, sixty-two pages, consists of a much more careful analysis and criticism of the metaphysical and ethical doctrines of von Hartmann, whom the author regards as "more representative of the most modern Pessimism," and related to his predecessor as Hegel to Kant. At the end of the chapter we have a confession of the author's own ethical faith, which, — as any one at all acquainted with modern ethical theory would have surmised almost from the first, — is the doctrine of 'self-realization.' Indeed, throughout the book, utilitarianism is treated with an impatience which is hardly deserved, whatever may be the difficulties connected with making the 'greatest happiness' principle the ethical ultimate. The author is a little incautious on the last page but one of the book, when he says, "The real sacrifice of the whole man to what heart and head recognize as the good character can neither be surmounted by Pessimism nor grounded on Hedonism." The "real sacrifice of the whole man," — and in some cases nothing less seems to be demanded, — is a pretty serious crux for the principle of 'self-realization,' strictly construed. ERNEST ALBEE.

*The Human Mind: a Text-book of Psychology.* By JAMES SULLY, examiner in Mental and Moral Science in the University of London. New York, D. Appleton & Co. — 2 vols., pp. xvii, 501 ; xii, 393.

Mr. Sully's chief aim in giving us this enlarged, and to some extent recast, version of his *Outlines*, was, he tells us in the preface, to meet the needs of "those who desire a fuller statement of the latest results of psychological research." The book, in consequence, bears some-